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Abstract—The rapid evolution of the blockchain community
has brought together stakeholders from fundamentally different
backgrounds: cryptographers, protocol designers, software devel-
opers, startup entrepreneurs, corporate executives and investors,
academics of various disciplines, and end users. The result is
a diverse ecosystem, presently exemplified by the development
of a wide range of different blockchain protocols. This raises
questions for policy and decision makers: How do different
protocols compare? What are their trade-offs? Existing efforts to
survey the area reveal a fragmented terminology, and the lack of
a unified framework to make the different desirable properties
of blockchain protocols explicit.
In this paper, we work towards bridging this gap. We eval-
uate protocols within a five-dimensional design space with the
following axes. Optimality: does the protocol achieve its main
goals? Stability: are the incentives of its participating agents
well-aligned? Efficiency: is its output maximal relative to its
use of resources? Robustness: can it cope when its operational
assumptions are invalid or perturbed? Persistence: can it recover
from catastrophic events? Based on the relevant literature, we
organize the properties of existing protocols in subcategories of
increasing granularity. The result is a dynamic scheme – termed
the PREStO framework. Its scope is to aid the communication
between stakeholders of different backgrounds, including man-
agers and investors, and to identify research challenges and
opportunities for blockchain protocols in a systematic way. We
illustrate this via use cases and make a first step to understand
the blockchain ecosystem through a more comprehensive lens.
Index Terms—Consensus Protocols, Cryptocurrency, Survey,
Incentives, Equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
In the seminal Bitcoin paper [137], the pseudonymous
Satoshi Nakamoto pioneered the use of blockchains as a secure
way of maintaining a ledger of currency transfers in a trustless
peer-to-peer network. In the ten years since, blockchains have
grown [60] to underpin a $100 billion cryptocurrency market
[49]. Meanwhile, its applicability is increasingly understood
in a broad range of other contexts [42], e.g., the Internet of
Things [75], supply chain management [114], healthcare [133],
etc. This rapid growth has induced a considerable number
of established market parties to invest in the sector [59],
[61], or even develop their own platforms. Main examples
of the latter include Quorum [152], which is developed by
JPMorgan Chase, and the HyperLedger umbrella project [38],
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hosted by the Linux Foundation and supported by, inter alia,
IBM and Intel. Applications of Quorum include JPMorgan’s
internal digital currency [161] and the Interbank Information
Network [44], [142], a platform for cross-border money trans-
fers. Applications of HyperLedger include a project by the
US retailer Walmart to track the movement of vegetables
[100], [170]. IBM by itself had 1500 employees working
on 500 blockchain-related projects in September 2018 [82].
Meanwhile, new multipurpose blockchain platforms developed
by startups continue to emerge, e.g., Ethereum [35], Cardano
[40], [109], Algorand [31], [88], and Zilliqa [192], [193].
This proliferation of blockchain technologies and applica-
tions has brought together stakeholders with fundamentally
different degrees of technical expertise. So far, the discourse
between these groups has been marked by the use of some-
times incongruous terminology, and the lack of a unified
communication framework [151]. This hampers the ability of
managers and investors to make business decisions, and of
newly proposed protocols to be compared and understood.
Particularly affected are one of the most fundamental technical
aspects of blockchain platforms: the consensus protocols.
Optimality
Stability
Efficiency
Robustness
Persistence
Fig. 1: The PREStO framework as a nesting doll of goals.
Consensus protocols fulfill, in a decentralized setting, the
role that a single authority has in a centralized database
or ledger. It is the mechanism to reach agreement among
self-interested peers, and for making consistent decisions out
of mutually exclusive alternatives. The choice of consensus
protocol has a major impact on a platform’s performance,
including its security and throughput, and is therefore impor-
tant for anyone who is involved in blockchain development
[126], particularly executives. This can be challenging if the
differences between the alternatives are not well understood.
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Statement of Contribution and Managerial Relevance
In this paper, we address these difficulties by developing
an accessible, yet technical and comprehensive framework
to improve the communication between the diverse partici-
pants of the blockchain ecosystem. We assume only a basic
understanding of mathematics and the high-level idea be-
hind blockchains, and introduce technical terms related to
blockchains and cryptocurrencies from the bottom up.
Our main contribution is the systematic development of the
PREStO framework [46], [187], which is a dynamic tool to
identify and classify properties of blockchain protocols. It is
an acronym (in reverse order) of its five main axes which are:
Optimality, Stability, Efficiency, Robustness and Persistence,
cf. Figure 1. In Table I, we capture the essence of each
category in a single question.
Dimension Description Section
Optimality Does the protocol maximize the quality of its core
outcomes under normal circumstances?
III
Stability Is the designed protocol an equilibrium? IV
Efficiency How does the protocol utilize its different re-
sources, e.g., time, space, energy, network band-
width?
V
Robustness Does the protocol’s performance withstand per-
turbations to its parameters?
VI
Persistence If the protocol is forced out of equilibrium, does
it recover?
VII
TABLE I: The five axes of PREStO and their main purpose.
PREStO’s modular structure is what sets it apart from re-
lated efforts and makes it valuable for the managerial practice.
Initially, the five categories can be seen as a nesting doll of
design goals, where each category considers a wider range
of desirable properties than the previous, cf. Figure 1. We
start at the very basic – i.e., optimal performance under ideal
conditions – and gradually build up to the more advanced –
e.g., recovery mechanisms to survive and sustain in the long
run. Subsequently, the axes are organized into subcategories of
increasing granularity, and PREStO develops into a dynamic
tool to identify and group together challenges and research
opportunities for the various blockchain protocols, cf. Table V.
We demonstrate its practical use via two running use cases,
Bitcoin and Quorum, and conclude with a schematic illustra-
tion of the resulting classification in Figure 5. We draw from
the existing literature to develop a systematic framework and
terminology to reason about blockchain protocols.
A Growing Ecosystem
The consensus protocol introduced by the first blockchain
platform – Bitcoin – is commonly called Nakamoto consensus
[173]. It was designed to work in a permissionless setting, i.e.,
a setting in which any node in the network is allowed to add
data to the blockchain. To prevent network overflow, nodes
seeking to extend the blockchain must spend computational
effort through a process called mining. In the presence of
competing chains, honest nodes accept the chain with the most
effort spent on creating it. Together, these rules ensure that if
more than 50% of the computational power is in the hands
of honest parties, then their chain will grow faster than all
others. Nodes are compensated for the spent computational
power through rewards in the form of tokens logged on the
blockchain. Variations of Nakamoto consensus are currently
implemented in over 600 cryptocurrencies [49], [190], includ-
ing the Ethereum platform and various Bitcoin spin-offs.
In recent years, Nakamoto consensus has increasingly drawn
criticism for its low transaction throughput and high energy
consumption. A single Bitcoin transaction costs more energy
than 100 000 Visa transactions, and the Bitcoin network as a
whole consumes as much energy as a medium-sized country
[63]. Furthermore, it is insecure in the sense that smaller plat-
forms are vulnerable to attackers who seize a majority of the
computational power, as witnessed by the recent 51% attacks
on Ethereum Classic [104] and Bitcoin Gold [156]. Finally,
research [70], [87], [160], [190] has shown that Nakamoto con-
sensus can be incentive-incompatible, i.e., participants can in-
crease their rewards by deviating from the protocol. To address
these weaknesses, a multitude of new consensus protocols have
been proposed that more closely follow traditional theory on
permissioned (i.e., not open) networks. In particular, many
approaches use variations of Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT)
protocols [117] or other classical consensus protocols such
as Paxos [116] and Raft [144]. Such approaches can achieve
gains in efficiency and security at the cost of centralization.
However, a precise description of this trade-off is complicated
due to the wide range in different BFT protocols, and the
lack of alignment between the terminology used by different
parties. This motivates the need for a formal framework to
describe and compare different consensus protocols.
Related Work
The necessity of developing a unified communication frame-
work for the blockchain ecosystem was already acknowledged
in [188]. Accordingly, a brief outline of the PREStO frame-
work was first introduced in [46]. While the five main axes
remain the same, their organization into subcategories is first
deployed in the present paper.
The rapid growth of the blockchain-related literature has
also stimulated other projects that survey the area from
different perspectives. Focusing exclusively on the Bitcoin
blockchain, [52] provide a systematic review of Bitcoin’s un-
derlying features, particularly its security and privacy-related
threats and vulnerabilities, and discuss directions for future re-
search. Their analysis extends initial analyses of the backbone
protocols of the main cryptocurrencies [78], [79], [81], [146].
In [173], further insight is provided into the development and
functionality of the Bitcoin blockchain, in addition to a non-
exhaustive, yet interesting timeline of papers related to the
analysis of Nakamoto consensus.
In a spirit closer to the present study, [183] acknowledge the
lack of a comprehensive literature review on the various layers
of blockchain technology, and provide a rigorous vision on the
organization of blockchain networks. Their work extends to
all aspects of the relevant technology and provides a central
reference for future work. They define four layers for any
blockchain system, from top to bottom: (1) the application
layer, (2) the virtual machine layer, (3) the consensus layer,
and (4) the network layer. In the present study, we focus
on the third (i.e., consensus) layer. That is, application-layer
properties, virtual-machine-layer properties (e.g., secure smart
contract languages such as Scilla [166]), and network-layer
properties (e.g., vulnerability to eclipse [95], BGP hijacking
[4], or DoS [105] attacks) are treated only if and when they
affect the consensus layer.
The difficulty to conceptualize the dramatically evolving
design landscape of blockchains is further supported by [17].
Similar to the present work, they focus on the consensus
layer and discuss the various themes and key approaches
that are exhibited by current blockchains. They systematize
distinctive features and technical properties of existing con-
sensus protocols and provide thorough comparisons along with
open questions and directions for future research. Despite the
common perspectives, our approach distinguishes itself from
[17] due to its mathematical framework that allows for a
description of properties from the ground up.
Using a practice-oriented focus, [66] develop BLOCK-
BENCH, a promising and publicly available software program
that is designed to test and compare the performance of
blockchain protocols. It applies to private blockchains and its
findings are mainly associated with properties in the categories
of Optimality and Efficiency of the PREStO framework, cf.
Sections III and V. The paper features use cases of the
Ethereum, Parity and Hyperledger blockchains and concludes
that these systems are still far from large-scale adoption. Fi-
nally, a non-exhaustive list of related surveys with focal points
ranging from smart contract execution to general blockchain
applications and research perspectives includes [9], [10], [28],
[39], [42], [53], [65], [80], [107], [167], [177], [186], [191].
Outline
The current paper is structured as follows. We begin by
defining an abstract, high-level model of a blockchain consen-
sus protocol in Section II. In Sections III to VII, we describe
the main PREStO axes and define their subgategories. We
summarize related issues and open questions related to each
category in Table V. Section VIII concludes our analysis with
general comments and directions for future work.
II. A MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR BLOCKCHAIN
CONSENSUS
To rigorously define the properties covered by the PREStO
framework, we require a mathematical model to serve as a ba-
sis. In this section, we will present this model by consecutively
describing the data on the blockchain (in Section II-A), the
participating nodes as individuals (in Section II-B), the nodes
as a network (in Section II-C), and the rewards and strategies
(in Section II-D). In all cases we denote the consensus protocol
by Π. To account for the wide variety of existing protocols and
the diversity of their technical features, we keep our model
as general as possible. However, we illustrate our presen-
tation using two running examples from the permissionless
and permissioned settings, respectively: 1) Bitcoin [137], and
2) Quorum [152], which uses the Istanbul-BFT consensus
protocol [102]. We also visualize the core concepts using
Figure 2 and Table II, which display the state of a Bitcoin-
like blockchain network at a given time t∗, and this network’s
evolution until and shortly after t∗, respectively.
A. Blockchains as Data Structures
At its core, a blockchain is a data structure that contains a se-
quence of elementary database operations called transactions.
The semantics of the transactions depend on the platform [55]
(e.g., they can represent token transfers, smart contract calls,
or sensor readings in an IoT context, etc). The transactions are
grouped into blocks. For simplicity, we assume that each block
B can be identified by a unique integer in N (e.g., via the hash
of its header). Each block B not only contains transactions,
but also a header that contains summary information about
the block. The header of a block contains a reference to the
block’s transactions – typically via a Merkle tree root [132]
– a timestamp, a reference to the previous block, and some
additional platform-specific data, cf. [29].
In our model, we represent the block’s timestamp as a
function T : N → R+, i.e., if a block B is created at
time t then t = T (B).1 The previous block of any block
B is also represented via a function P : N → N, i.e., B
points to P (B) as its previous block. For brevity, we write
P 2 (B) = P (P (B)), P 3 (B) = P (P (P (B))), etc. The first
block g is called the genesis or the genesis block, and is the
only block to not have a previous block, i.e., P (g) = ∅. Using
P , we can construct for each block B a chain of blocks C(B)
to the genesis, i.e., C (B) =
(
B,P (B) , P 2 (B) , . . . , g
)
. The
chain is cryptographically secure, i.e., the relationship between
a block B and its predecessor P (B) is given by encapsulating
all information in P (B) in B via a cryptographic hash
function. Essentially, if even a single bit of data in P (B) is
changed, then executing the hash function on its header will
produce a different hash, and the relationship between B and
P (B) is broken.
At any point in time, the complete structure of the blocks
created so far can be represented using a Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG), where blocks are the vertices and a directed
edge between blocks B and B′ exists if B′ = P (B), see
Figure 2b for an example. In this paper, we only consider
chain-based protocols, i.e., protocols for which the validity
and the output of a transaction within any block B depends
only on C(B). That is, we do not include protocols such as
Avalanche [176] and IOTA’s Tangle, even though some of the
definitions in the PREStO framework may still be applicable.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). In Bitcoin, transactions represent token
transfers between users. Transactions also include fees that
1In practice, the block creator has considerable freedom in choosing the
timestamp [174].
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r1,1 : 10 tH/s
V1:
M1:
transaction 0x78...
transaction 0xa6...
transaction 0x29...
transaction 0x10...
...
r2,1 : 8 tH/s
V2:
M2:
transaction 0x20...
transaction 0x4e...
transaction 0x98...
transaction 0x8b...
...
r3,1 : 6 tH/s
V3:
M3:
transaction 0x20...
transaction 0x4e...
transaction 0x98...
transaction 0xac...
...
(a) The peer-to-peer network
g B1
B2
B3
B4
T (B0) : 0
genesis coinbase
T (B1) : 160
coinbase: node 2
transaction 0xc5...
T (B2) : 239
coinbase: node 1
transaction 0x87...
transaction 0x6b...
transaction 0x91...
transaction 0xa2...
...
T (B3) : 241
coinbase: node 3
transaction 0x87...
transaction 0x6b...
transaction 0x91...
transaction 0xbb...
...
T (B4) : 668
coinbase: node 1
transaction 0x20...
transaction 0x4e...
transaction 0x98...
transaction 0xac...
...
(b) The blockchain DAG
Fig. 2: The state of a Bitcoin-like blockchain network 700 seconds after genesis (t∗ = 700): (a) the peer-to-peer network, including for each
node i their view V tn (with the head Htn colored), resources rtn, and memory pool M tn (b) the blockchain itself, given as a graph (Vt, E)
where Vt = ∪nV tn and (B,B′) ∈ E iff B′ = P (B).
are paid to block creators. Among the block header fields, the
proof-of-work, W : N→ R+ is also relevant.
Example 2 (Quorum). Quorum is based on Ethereum, and
hence the transactions not only represent token transfers, but
also smart contract calls and creations. The protocol messages
of Instanbul-BFT, e.g., prepare and commit messages, are also
seen as transactions, even though only the commit messages
are included in the block (yet they are not referred to in the
header).
B. Nodes and Resources
The blockchain protocol is operated by a set N of agents
called nodes, which are identified by their index n ∈ N. To
participate, each node n provides each of m distinct resources.
The amount of resource i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} contributed by node
n is denoted by rn,i ∈ R+. Since resources change over
time, we will write ~r tn =
(
rtn,1, . . . , r
t
i,m
)
for the vector of
resources of node n at time point t > 0. Accordingly, let
~Rtn = (R
t
n,1, . . . , R
t
n,m) :=
∑
n∈N ~r
t
n be the vector of total
protocol resources at timepoint t > 0. We similarly define
ptn,i := r
t
n,i/R
t
n,i as the fraction of resource i owned by node
n at 0. We say that a group of nodes N ⊂ N is α-strong with
α ∈ [0, 1] for resource i ⊂ N if∑
n∈N
pn,i ≥ α,
This can be generalized to multiple resources, but we omit this
for the sake of brevity. When only a single resource is critical
to the consensus mechanism, we omit the subscript i entirely
and write pn. We will omit the superscript t whenever it is
irrelevant. If rtn,i > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then we will say
that node n is active at timepoint t. Nodes communicate with
other nodes via a software application called a client.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). In Bitcoin, we can identify three major
“types” of nodes:
1. mining nodes, who create new blocks by solving computa-
tional “puzzles”,
2. full nodes, who verify blocks before accepting them (i.e.,
check whether all the included transactions are valid), and
3. light nodes, who only verify block headers, and are only in-
terested in checking the inclusion of individual transactions
via Simplified Payment Verification (SPV).
The foremost resource rn,1 of node n is processing power:
typically a mining node will need a great amount of it (e.g.,
an ASIC rig), a full node a moderate amount (e.g., a high-
end PC), and a light node very little (e.g., a smartphone).
The model for Bitcoin can further be extended by including
bandwidth as a separate resource rn,2.
Example 2 (Quorum). In a permissioned blockchain, there
can still be full nodes and light nodes, but mining nodes
are unnecessary and processing power is less important (yet
still required to, e.g., verify signatures). The main resource
is access to the private keys that allow for the creation of
blocks, i.e., authority. We model this in the following way:
assume that there are k private keys for block creation. Then
for all n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that rn,i = 1 if
node n controls key i, and rn,i = 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
rn,k+1 denotes the processing power of node n and rn,k+2 the
bandwidth. Note that it is possible for more than one nodes
to have access to the same private key, e.g., after a hack.
C. Blockchains as Peer-to-Peer Networks
Each node n ∈ N has incoming and outgoing connections
to other protocol-running nodes. The resulting peer-to-peer
Time Event Type V1 V2 V3
same
view
same
head
ongoing
fork
0 genesis 4 4 8
160 node 2 mines block B1 8 8 8
168 node 3 receives block B1 8 8 8
196 node 1 receives block B1 4 4 8
239 node 1 mines block B2 8 8 8
241 node 3 mines block B3 8 8 4
248 node 2 receives block B3 8 8 4
272 node 2 receives block B2 8 8 4
275 node 3 receives block B2 8 8 4
281 node 1 receives block B3 4 8 4
668 node 1 mines block B4 8 8 4
702 node 2 receives block B4 8 8 4
710 node 3 receives block B4 4 4 8
TABLE II: An example of the evolution of blockchain network of Figure 2. Each row corresponds to an event: it displays its time t of
occurrence and its type (mining or propagation). Furthermore, we display the view Vi of each node i ∈ {1, 2, 3} after the event, and note
whether the nodes’ views and/or heads are consistent across the network and whether a fork is ongoing. Events related to the dissemination
of transactions are not included for brevity.
network can be represented as a graph where the vertices rep-
resent nodes and edges represent connections – see Figure 2a
for an illustration. Not every node is necessarily connected to
all other nodes, however it is typically assumed that from each
node a path to every other node exists in the graph. If this is
not the case, then there is an ongoing network partition.
At each time t ≥ 0, each node n ∈ N is aware of a set
V tn ⊆ N of blocks: we call V tn the view of node n at time
t. The genesis block g is the only block that all nodes are
aware of at time 0, i.e., V 0n = {g} for all n ∈ N. In addition
to V tn , each node n ∈ N is also aware of transactions that
have not been included in any block at time point t > 0. This
information is stored in the memory pool, denoted by M tn,
for n ∈ N and t > 0. Due to the distributed nature of the
network, there exist points in time for which different nodes
are aware of different sets of blocks or different information,
i.e., there exist t > 0 and nodes n,m ∈ N such that V tn 6= V tm
or M tn 6= M tm.
At any time t, each node n ∈ N that can create blocks has
to decide which block in V tn to extend. This block is called
the head, and is represented by the variable Htn. A function f
that selects a head from a view is called a fork-choice rule. A
network fork is any period during which at least two (protocol-
following) nodes have incompatible blocks as heads. Here, we
mean by “incompatible blocks” two blocks B and B′ such that
neither is in the chain of the other, i.e., B /∈ C(B′) and B′ /∈
C (B). The term “fork” is also commonly used in practice to
refer to protocol changes. That is, if the protocol is changed
from Π to Π′ and blocks created under Π′ are still considered
valid by Π, then this is referred to as a soft fork. If not, the
change is called a hard fork.
Due to network forks, a block B can be orphaned, which
occurs if at some point of time t, there is no n ∈ N such
that B ∈ C(Htn). We say that a block B is overturned by
node n at time t if B ∈ lim↓0 C(Ht−n ) and B /∈ C(Htn).
For example, in Table II, a network fork occurs from time
241 until time 710. Block B3 (the teal block) is overturned
by node 2 at time 702 and by node 3 at time 710. In practice,
blockchain users need either a formal or heuristic notion of
finality – i.e., a notion of when a block can be assumed to
not be overturned. For example, an online retailer will need to
decide when a block that contains a payment is safe enough
from being overturned to dispatch the order.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). In Bitcoin, the fork-choice rule pre-
scribes to select the block B with the highest accumulated
proof-of-work, i.e.,
f (V ) = arg max
B∈V
∑
B′∈C(B)
W (B′) .
In case of ties, the block seen first is preferred. This can lead
to soft forks that persist even when all nodes have the same
view, as illustrated in Table II. In [70], it was suggested that
adversarial behavior can be discouraged by using uniform tie
breaking – whenever a node learns of a new block that has
as much proof-of-work as its head, it adopts the new block as
its head with probability 0.5. As further discussed in [160],
this can have either a positive or negative effect on attackers,
depending on how well-connected they are within the network.
For finality, Bitcoin users typically use the six confirmations
rule [168]: i.e., a block B is considered final by n at time t
if there exists a B′ ∈ V tn such that B = P 6(B′).
Example 2 (Quorum). In the Istanbul-BFT protocol used
by Quorum, blocks are added to the blockchain if they are
confirmed by more than 2/3 of the voters. In particular, let, for
any block B ∈ N and private key i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, 1Mtn(i, B)
equal 1 if M tn contains a “commit” message for B signed with
i, and 0 otherwise. Then block B is considered a valid block
by node n at time t if∑k
i=1 1Mtn(i, B) ≥ (2/3) k.
This is also the finality rule: i.e., in Quorum, all blocks are
either both valid and finalized, or neither. This is true for many
other BFT protocols as well.
D. Actions, Strategies, and Utilities
Based on the above, the state Xt of the blockchain at
timepoint t ≥ 0 is a vector
Xt :=
(
V tn, H
t
n,M
t
n, r
t
n
)
n∈N . (1)
When time is not relevant, we simply write X instead of Xt.
The state space, i.e., the set of all possible states Xt will be
denoted by X .
Transitions to new states typically occur through operations
or actions performed by the nodes. Each protocol Π has its
own set of actions, and conditions under which they are avail-
able. We denote by A the set of all possible actions allowed
by the protocol. Let a strategy s : X → A be a function from
the state space to the set of actions – i.e., during execution, a
node uses its strategy to select which action to take given the
state of the system (where ‘waiting’ can be an action). Let S
denote the set of all possible strategies. Particularly relevant
to our presentation is the default strategy or the strategy that
prescribes to follow-the-protocol as referenced, which we will
denote by d. We will call any other strategy s ∈ S with s 6= d
a deviant or adversarial strategy. Also, we will refer to nodes
that follow d as honest and to nodes that do not follow d as
adversarial nodes. If a node takes an action, then the system
state is changed after a random delay. Let At be the set of
completed actions until time t. This imposes a probability
measure on system executions, i.e., given a strategy profile
S = ×n∈N sn, then for all y, z ∈ X and t, δ ≥ 0 we should
be able to determine PS(Xt+δ = y |Xt = z). Each agent
n ∈ N has utility functions un : X → R, which indicates
their satisfaction with a given network state, and u′n : A → R,
which indicates their satisfaction with a given action. Given
an initial state x0, the long-term average utility vn(S, x0) with
a given strategy profile S is then given by
vn(S, x0) = ES
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
(∫ t
0
un(Xτ )dτ +
∑
a∈At
u′n(a)
))
.
In the present study, rather than analyzing individual strate-
gic behavior, we mainly focus on collective protocol perfor-
mance and blockchain properties. To formalize these notions,
we define a property or feature of a blockchain protocol Π as
a function FΠ : X → {0, 1}, with the following values
FΠ (Xt) =
{
1, if Π satisfies property FΠ at state Xt,
0, otherwise.
Additionally, we define aggregate utilities or performance
measures of protocol Π as functions UΠ : X → R. We
will use the terms positive performance measures when higher
values indicate better performance, such as throughput rate
and collective profits, and negative performance measures
when lower values do, such as communication complexity and
operational costs.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). The core actions that any node n in
Bitcoin can perform are block creation, block propagation,
transaction creation, and transaction propagation. Of these,
block creation takes an amount of time that is approximately
exponentially distributed [58], [157] with a mean determined
by the node’s processing power. The time needed to create
transactions is negligible. Block and transaction propagation
times depend on the network latency, the node’s bandwidth,
connectivity, and the message size. More generally, block
validation can be included as a separate action that consumes
processing power. Also, if a node n represents a mining pool,
then the entering or exiting of n by other nodes can be
considered as actions.
Example 2 (Quorum). Instanbul-BFT has the same core ac-
tions as Bitcoin, but also includes the propagation of protocol
messages, e.g., prepares and commits. Unlike Bitcoin, block
creation is nearly instantaneous, but a node’s block is only
valid if it has been selected as the block proposer (e.g., via
a round-robin scheme) for the current round. Under certain
conditions, e.g., if a block proposer waits too long before
proposing a block, the other nodes can request a round change.
If a supermajority of nodes agree on a round change, or sign
off on a block, the next round begins.
Throughout the text, we will frequently use the terms (and
abbreviations)
• Proof of Work (PoW): As already mentioned, this refers
to Nakamoto consensus [137] in which nodes, also called
miners, gain the right to participate in the block creation
process by providing solutions to a computationally difficult
and energy-consuming cryptographic puzzle.
• Proof of Stake (PoS): Often called Virtual Mining [21],
PoS emulates the above process but saves on energy waste
by requiring from participating nodes to provide proof of
“virtual” resources such as the platform’s native tokens.
We will call a protocol permissionless if the consensus-critical
resources are not inherent to the blockchain (e.g., processing
power in PoW). We will a protocol semi-permissionless if the
consensus-critical resources are inherent to the blockchain,
but freely divisible and transferable (e.g., tokens in PoS).
We will call a protocol permissioned if the consensus-critical
resources are inherent to the blockchain and indivisible. An
example is given by private keys in Proof of Authority, a
consensus scheme in which the only nodes that are allowed to
create blocks are hard-coded in the clients and the protocol,
or centrally controlled in any other way.
We are now ready to define the 5 axes of the PREStO
framework and describe their subcategories.
III. OPTIMALITY
Optimality is the most basic property of a protocol, and
generally refers to whether the protocol is optimal within its
operational scope. In our setting, it concerns the question:
Q: Under normal conditions, does the protocol provide its
core functionality in an optimal way?
By “normal conditions”, we mean that nodes do not act
strategically or maliciously, and that there are no capacity
constraints. However, we do consider network latency and
nodes going offline. “Core functionality” primarily refers to
the functionality of any distributed database, i.e., to correctly
read and write to the database. However, some protocols also
provide additional functionalities, e.g., a broader notion of
transaction types, or a higher level of privacy.
A. Liveness and Safety
Since blockchains are essentially data structures, they must
adequately perform the read and write operations that are
required of any database. We focus on the data in the finalized
blocks of the chain, because the overturning of non-finalized
blocks is not faulty behavior [168]. The “write” operation
then consists of adding a transaction to a finalized block on
the chain. The “read” operation consists of observing that a
transaction has made it into a finalized block on the chain.
The ability to write and read correctly is formalized through
the notions of liveness and safety. A liveness fault means that a
node is unable to write to the blockchain. A safety fault means
either that two honest nodes see different results when reading
the database, or that a single node sees different results when
reading the database at different times.2 This informs our two
general definitions of liveness and safety below.
2These two types of safety faults are practically equivalent: if two nodes
see different results, then either the network remains permanently forked, or
at least one of them will read a different value at some point in the future.
Definition 1 (Liveness). We say that a protocol Π is live if
from any state X ∈ X , any protocol-following node n ∈ N
can take a sequence of actions a1, a2, . . . , am that will lead to
a valid transaction being added to a final block in its view.
Definition 2 (Safety). We say that a protocol Π is safe if
the following holds: any protocol-following node n ∈ N who
considers a block B as final at some time point T ≥ 0, will
also consider B as final at any time point t > T .
In practice, most protocols satisfy these properties only
under certain conditions. In particular, most require that the
honest nodes control a given fraction of the consensus-critical
resources. For example, Bitcoin is safe only if the honest nodes
are over 50%-strong in terms of processing power, and even
for then only with some probability.3 Quorum is live only if
the honest and not permanently offline nodes are at least 23 -
strong, and safe only if the adversarial nodes are less than
2
3 -strong, in terms of authority.
During a network partition, protocols can either satisfy
liveness or safety, but not both – this is known as the CAP
theorem [89]. Different protocols resolve this trade-off in
different ways. Liveness-oriented protocols such as Nakamoto
consensus allow the chain to fork, and for this fork to be re-
solved when the partition ends by, e.g., the longest-chain rule.
Safety-oriented protocols such as Tendermint [115] and most
other Byzantine fault tolerant protocols [38], [181] require
that a (super)majority of participants sign off on each block.
This means that during a network partition, at least one of the
branches of the chain stops growing. In other settings, different
branches of the chain can grow during a fork, but on only one
of these branches can blocks be finalized. Examples include
a traditional proof-of-work chain with Casper the Friendly
Finality Gadget as an overlay (‘hybrid’ Casper) [36], [37].
It is also possible for protocols to guarantee neither liveness
nor safety, e.g., Tangaroa [39].
In the scientific literature, the definitions and terminology
used for safety and liveness properties may differ. Algorand
[88] provides its own definitions of liveness (new transactions
can be added to the final part of the blockchain) and safety (if
a node accept a transaction as final, then it will continue to do
so). In [57], [78], [109], [146], safety is called persistence –
in turn, persistence and liveness can be shown to follow from
the three properties common prefix, chain quality, and chain
growth. For the Snow White [23], [54] and Tortoise and Hares
[22] protocols, chain growth, chain quality, and consistency are
considered. Here, consistency is a combination of common
prefix and future self-consistency. In [17], the properties of
validity and agreement are discussed as liveness properties,
whereas integrity and total order are used for safety.
Typically, liveness and safety are proven for a specific
protocol through a bespoke mathematical proof. However,
under some assumptions on the actions in the protocol, general
proof techniques may be available, e.g., model checking [25].
3However, this probability can be made arbitrarily high by increasing the
number of confirmations required to make a block final.
B. Transaction Scope
Some protocols offer fundamentally different types of
transactions than others. For example, Bitcoin only supports
monetary transactions, which allows for the entire “state” of
the system to be described using unspent transaction outputs
(UTXOs). However, protocols that allow for smart contracts
(e.g., Ethereum [35]) require that the clients also store the
internal variables of the contracts [55]. This may have an
impact of efficiency (see also Section V), both via reduced
throughput due to slower transaction processing, and poten-
tially less straightforward scalability (“state sharding” [193]).
C. Privacy
The choice to put data on a blockchain instead of a central-
ized database has implications for privacy. On one hand, per-
missionless blockchains such as Bitcoin do not require identity
management, which is good for privacy. On the other hand, the
entire history of transactions is publicly accessible, which may
allow for de-anonymization. In fact, Bitcoin transactions may
be better described as pseudonymous than as anonymous [43].
Cryptographic techniques that improve privacy, e.g., zero-
knowledge proofs [91] or ring signatures [155], are available,
although they may impose additional computational overhead
and therefore impact efficiency. Furthermore, usage pattern
analysis can lead to user de-anonymization even in privacy-
minded platforms such as Zcash [106].
IV. STABILITY
Since intended behavior cannot be enforced in decentralized
settings, one of the core tasks of consensus protocols is to
incentivize agents to reach an outcome that is both stable and
desirable. In general, it is concerned with the question:
Q: Does the protocol incentivize the intended behavior? Is
implementing and following-the-protocol the best possi-
ble strategy for participating and prospective nodes?
Game theory and traditional economics provide numerous
tools to analyze this setting. Yet, as consensus protocols be-
come more elaborate, the range of incentives and the required
stabilizing mechanisms also become more complicated. These
issues are discussed separately below.
A. Incentive Compatibility
At its core, incentive compatibility entails that it is in the
participants’ best interest to follow-the-protocol. In concrete
terms, and using the notation of Section II, this means that the
default strategy profile ×n∈Nd is a Nash equilibrium, [138],
[180]. An equilibrium is an outcome that is optimal from the
perspective of all decision makers involved. Formally,
Definition 3 (Incentive Compatibility). Let Π denote a pro-
tocol with active nodes N ⊂ N, strategies S, and long-term
average utility functions vn as defined in Section II for all
n ∈ N. Also, let d ∈ S denote the follow-the-protocol strategy,
D = ×n∈N d the strategy profile where all nodes follow d,
and Dn,s the profile where all nodes follow d except node n
who follows s ∈ S. Then, Π is incentive-compatible, if
vn (D,x0) ≥ vn (Dn,s, x0) , for all s ∈ S, n ∈ N ,
and x0 ∈ X . In words, Π is incentive-compatible, if given that
all other nodes follow the protocol, then it is optimal for an
entering (or existing) node to also follow the protocol.
This definition relies on some assumptions that are not
always satisfied in practice. First, it assumes that each node
can take as given that all other agents do follow the protocol
(strategy d) and second, that all agents are rational, i.e., utility
maximizers. Also, it requires known utility functions for all
nodes. While seemingly restrictive, establishing stability of a
protocol within this vanilla setting is a core step in protocol
design. It is within the scope primarily of robustness and to
a lesser extent of persistence to explore what will happen if
these assumptions are violated, cf. Sections VI and VII.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). Nash equilibria in Bitcoin mining are
discussed in [70] and [108]. Among others, these works show
that whether the Bitcoin protocol is an equilibrium depends on
the mining resources of a potential adversary (rational node) as
a fraction of the total. [113] find that there is a multiplicity of
symmetric equilibria in the Bitcoin protocol. Still, the default
strategy prevails by a focal-point argument [136], [162]. [70]
and [160] show that if nodes are at least α-strong, where α
depends on their connectivity, then they are incentivized to
follow the adversarial selfish mining strategy. [139] combine
selfish mining – a consensus-layer attack – with an eclipse
attack – a network-layer attack – to augment the rewards
of selfish mining. Despite their theoretical plausibility, such
attacks have not been recorded in practice.
Based on the above, the task of the blockchain architect is
to engineer the consensus protocol in a way to induce the
desired behavior in practice. Differences between intended
and observed behavior should be addressed at this point.
The theoretical discipline that models and studies such set-
tings is mechanism design [14], [122], [136]. Applied in the
blockchain context, its aim is to determine the rules of the
protocol in a way that individual incentives will be perfectly
aligned with societal goals.
The notion of incentive compatibility can be seen beyond
just Nash equilibria. For example, depending on whether the
majority is controlled by a single entity or not, one may
discern between strong and weak incentive compatibility [27].
Additionally, in practice following-the-protocol extends to a set
of operations that need to be performed by nodes rather than
a single action. In particular, a consensus protocol of a pub-
lic, permissionless blockchain needs to properly incentivize
rational agents to perform the following actions:
• Participation: acquire protocol resources, e.g., bandwidth.
• Operations: perform core and auxiliary tasks such as pro-
posal and creation of blocks, message propagation, transac-
tion validation and execution, data storage, etc [43].
• Applications: use the native cryptocurrency or blockchain
related applications (“Dapps”).
Although integral to their viability, not all these actions are
properly incentivized in existing blockchains, and miners’
incentives may be at odds with the underlying protocol [171].
Additional concerns stem from the tension between short-term
and long-term incentives [118]. In [153], a consensus protocol
is proposed that motivates both ownership and participation,
and which is apt to develop blockchains for social interaction.
In [84], it is shown that economic motives for miners –
transaction fees and block rewards – are also inherent to the
security of PoS protocols. Finally, recent works suggest repu-
tation systems as possible solutions to improve the incentive
mechanisms of consensus protocols [121], [141].
The diversity of entities that are involved in the blockchain
ecosystem introduces additional complexity. Different groups
ranging from investors, developers, token holders to participat-
ing nodes and end users often do have conflicting incentives.
This implies that apart from the need to incentivize certain
operations, like the ones mentioned above, the blockchain
protocol also needs to align potentially conflicting incentives
of these groups. Similar concerns emerge in bockchain-based
business markets or applications which entail the interac-
tion between infrastructure and cyber-security providers, en-
trepreneurs and users in a trustless environment [74].
Theory on social choice and public goods provides insight
into misaligned blockchain incentives [163]. A notable in-
stance is captured by the free-rider or pass-the-bucket problem
[19], [172]. In simplified terms, it states that rational agents
who benefit from the existence of a public good – in this
case, the blockchain – may shift responsibility for its creation
to their peers. In the resulting equilibrium, the public good
is not created, to everyone’s detriment. In public, permis-
sionless blockchains, this translates to nodes moving costly
tasks to other nodes, leading to an improper functionality
of the blockchain ecosystem and deviation from its intended
outcome.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). To explain the lack of observed selfish
mining incidents, [13] suggest natural incentives (i.e., mining
rewards) and the high monetary value of Bitcoin as factors
[77]. Yet, [68] identify incentives for attacks between miners
and argue that the prevailing practice of not engaging in these
attacks is fragile and if broken will lead to equilibria with dire
consequences for the blockchain ecosystem.
In [12], it is argued that the Bitcoin reference protocol
disincentivizes the propagation of information. In [8], it is
demonstrated that the active usage of Bitcoin remains low, and
largely restricted to speculation and illegal activity — this has
a negative impact on the stability of Bitcoin’s exchange rate
with fiat currencies, an issue also discussed in [113]. In [189],
a scheme to incentivize miners to promptly propagate any
blocks that they know of is proposed as a way to effectively
defend against certain adversarial strategies.
Many blockchain platforms include transaction fees that are
paid by the transaction creator to the node that creates a block
that includes their transaction. Transaction fees also impact
the incentives of Bitcoin users. Currently, Bitcoin transaction
fees are low, yet non-zero [113]. However, in Turing-complete
environments (e.g., Ethereum), transactions typically require
more computation, which makes these environments particu-
larly vulnerable to network-layer attacks [129]. Based on the
resource utilized most, there are three main sources of cost
for the miners: network, computation and storage. In [45], a
fee-paying scheme for memory consumption that is typical to
cloud storage services is proposed. In contrast to the currently
deterministic transaction fees, [90] propose the idea of random
payments to incentivize risk-neutral miners. In [41], the future
of Bitcoin mining is analyzed, when mining rewards will have
diminished, and conclude that if transaction fees are the only
incentive, then selfish mining will be profitable for miners
with arbitrarily small wealth. In the case that transaction fees
can be further reduced, [47] argue that cryptocurrencies have
the potential to become viable alternatives to retail payment
schemes.
Protocol Resources: Protocol stability is tightly linked
to the way that participating nodes acquire and increment
their resources, which is starkly different between, e.g., PoW
and PoS. In PoW protocols such as Bitcoin, computational
(CPU) power is the consensus-critical resource. This implies
that the costs for participating nodes are mainly electricity
and investment in mining equipment [62]. These resources
can be acquired in fiat currencies, yet, the mining rewards
are distributed in the native cryptocurrency (Bitcoins).
PoS protocols generate different dynamics. Virtual miners
acquire their resources by converting fiat currency to the
native cryptocurrency which they then use as a proof to
participate in the consensus mechanism. Mining rewards are
again distributed in the native currency, however, in this case,
the rewards naturally contribute to the protocol resources. This
creates conflicting motives for staking nodes, since wealth and
resources coincide and may lead to unpredictable inflation or
disincentives to use or spend one’s stake. These observations
call for a re-evaluation of the economics of different protocols
through the lens of novel macroeconomic tools. Integral are
the questions about the distribution of resources, the corre-
sponding entry barriers, and market dynamics – perfect or
oligopolistic competition – that they induce [5], [120].
B. Decentralization
Decentralization lies at the core of blockchain design phi-
losophy and is therefore integral for its long-term survival
and sustainability [120], [130]. However, existing data shows
that centralization plagues PoW (and PoS) cryptocurrencies
of both high and low market values [30], [76]. Miners join
centralized pools, in particular to efficiently distribute min-
ing rewards among their participants and hence reduce their
variance [157], [164], [175]. Yet, the operation of mining
pools introduces unpredictable dynamics in the consensus
mechanism and incentivizes miners (or protocol participants)
to behave dishonestly, especially under high transaction loads,
and destabilize the system [123], [141]. For instance, staking
pools – the equivalent of mining pools in PoS protocols – can
potentially evolve to become institutions with arbitrary power
over their cryptocurrency [30], [71].
In conventional market economics, market concentration is
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), [154].
In general, the HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of
the market shares of the firms within the industry where the
market shares are expressed as percentages. As such, it can
range from 0 to 10, 000, with higher values indicating larger
concentration4. In the blockchain context, it can be used to
study the concentration of protocol resources. For a state X
of protocol Π with active nodes N ⊂ N, and distribution
of consensus-critical resource fractions (pn)n∈N , the HHI is
given by
HHIΠ (X) :=
∑
n∈N (pn · 100%)2
The HHI is used in the context of antitrust management and
also in applied social and political sciences to measure the
concentration of political power [119], [178].
Example 1 (Bitcoin & Ethereum). Table III shows the es-
timated distribution of mining power between the top 10
Ethereum mining pools (or accounts) by number of blocks.
BITCOIN ETHEREUM
Entity (Pool) Blocks % Entity (Pool) Blocks %
1. BTC.com 20.1% Ethermine 26.5%
2. AntPool 14.5% Sparkpool 24.5%
3. F2Pool 13.1% F2Pool 2 11.8%
4. Slushpool 8.8% Nanopool 11.2%
5. Poolin 8.8% MiningPoolHub 1 5.4%
6. ViaBTC 8.3% Address 1 2.3%
7. BTC.TOP 6.1% Address 2 1.7%
8. BitFury 4.9% DwarfPool 1 1.7%
9. BitClub Network 1.7% zhizhu.top 1.3%
10. Bitcoin.com 1.4% firepool 1.2%
Total: 87.7% 87.6%
HH Index: 1075.7 1610.5
TABLE III: Concentration of mining power for the Bitcoin and
Ethereum blockchains (as of 07 June 2019) and calculation of the
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). Sources: blockchain.com and
etherscan.io.
The figures indicate a more decentralized market for Bitcoin
than for Ethereum. Similar calculations indicate even higher
centralization for smaller PoW platforms, for which 51%
attacks – distributions in which a single entity owns more
than 50% of the resources – are a reality [87], [96], [104].
These figures fuel the concerns that the current structure of
the blockchain system is prone to centralization [4], [86].
4The USA Department of Justice considers a market with an HHI of
less than 1,500 to be a competitive marketplace, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500
to be a moderately concentrated marketplace, and an HHI of 2,500 or
greater to be a highly concentrated marketplace. However, these thresholds
refer to oligopolistic markets and should be much lower when studying
decentralization in blockchains.
From a stability perspective, [139] argue in favor of dis-
persing mining power since following the protocol remains
a Nash equilibrium only for small hashpower. Incentives to
derive short-term profits from attacks on mining pools threaten
the long-term viability of Bitcoin and negatively impact the
Bitcoin ecosystem [118]. [105] show that pool size and com-
putational power are the main reasons to launch a network-
level attack against a particular mining pool. Derivative attacks
threaten also variant PoW blockchains [87].
Ideally, nodes should have no motive to band together at
all. This informs the following definition:
Definition 4 (Perfect Decentralization). Let protocol Π in any
state X ∈ X consist of nodes N ⊂ N, such that each node n ∈
N controls a fraction pn of the consensus-critical resource. Let
the state Xnm, for n,m ∈ N , be the same state as X except
with nodes n and m merged, and their resources combined.
Also, let d ∈ S denote the follow-the-protocol strategy and
D = ×n∈N d the strategy profile where all nodes follow d.
Then a protocol satisfies perfectly decentralization if
vn(D,X) ≥ vn(D,Xnm) for all n,m ∈ N .
Such a definition depends strongly on the utility functions:
e.g., in Bitcoin, banding together always reduces the reward
variance, but when the pools, get too strong, trust in the system
is undermined and Bitcoins will lose value against other
(crypto)currencies. For example, the mining pool GHash.IO
was forced to take action to reduce their pool size after they
surpassed the 50% mark [72].
Mining pools are not the only threat to decentralization.
Other sources involve the underlying network layer, the ge-
ographic or economic motives to concentrate mining rigs in
countries with low energy cost, and the increasingly sophis-
ticated technology that is required to participate in the block
creation process [183]. [50] study anti-trust policies in Turing-
complete blockchains, i.e., blockchains that also support smart
contract execution, and argue that although smart contracts
mitigate information asymmetries and improve social welfare,
they also encourage collusions and hence, generate a threat
to decentralization. [81] develop a method to bootstrap the
blockchain even without a genesis block created by a trusted
authority. In all cases, the threats of centralization and trust
formation raise the closely related question of blockchain gov-
ernance and sustainability in the long run which is addressed
in Section VII, [26]. Various sources of centralization in the
blockchain ecosystem are illustrated in Figure 3.
C. Fairness
An integral element of stability in non-permissioned proto-
cols is fairness, which relies on the premise that participating
nodes should be rewarded proportionally to their resource
contribution. Recall that each node n ∈ N participates in
the protocol by providing some consensus-critical resource rn
which corresponds to a proportion pn of the total resources. If
UT denotes the total rewards (UT can be positive or negative)
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Fig. 3: Centralization in the blockchain ecosystem: mining or staking
pools, fin-tech institutions and intermediaries who offer services –
verification, monitoring, data analytics – on public, permissionless
blockchains may add value to the ecosystem but also pose a threat to
decentralization. The dashed lines indicate possible interconnections
between these entities which may further centralize the system.
distributed by the protocol to nodes over a (long) period T of
time, then we can formally define fairness as follows.
Definition 5 (Fairness [147]). The reward allocation mecha-
nism of a protocol Π is said to be (α, )-fair for some  > 0,
if in the presence of an α-strong adversary, each node n ∈ N
can guarantee (1− ) · pn ·UT of the rewards over any period
of length T .
Achieving fairness seems challenging in practice. Message
delays and network latency can cause disproportional distribu-
tion of rewards [93]. Focusing on PoS protocols, [71] introduce
the notion of equitability to quantify how much a proposer can
amplify her stake compared to her initial investment. Even
with everyone following the protocol (i.e., honest behavior),
existing methods of allocating block rewards lead to poor
equitability, as does the initialization of systems with small
stake pools and/or large rewards relative to the stake pool.
Consensus in distributed computing with weighted nodes and
more general notions of fairness are studied in [6], [83],
[182]. [147] extend this notion to environments with adaptive
corruption by strengthening the definition of “ideal protocol
quality” defined in [78] and [146].
Fairness in blockchains can be understood as a two dimen-
sional notion that entails both the reward allocation and the
block creation mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 4. Current
protocols are based on the premise that proportional voting
is fair, [121]. However, the simple and seemingly appealing
axiom “one unit of resource (one computer or one coin),
one vote” has been theoretically refuted in traditional voting
systems [16], [184].
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Fig. 4: Fairness in the two core mechanisms of blockchain protocols:
allocation of rewards and aggregation of voting data in the block
creation process. Rewards are fairly allocated if they are proportional
to participants’ resources. However, fairness in proportional voting is
a premise that has been theoretically challenged, [73].
More importantly, node selection proportionally to their
resources – as in current PoW and PoS protocols – does
not necessarily imply fairness in the voting process, [73]. An
illustration is provided in the following example.
Example 3. To understand what can go wrong, consider a
simplified blockchain network with three nodes that control
p1 = 0.45, p2 = 0.4 and p3 = 0.15 of protocol resources,
respectively. The paradox that arises under pure proportional
voting, and which is already known in political science, is that
the weaker node 3 is equally powerful with the much stronger
node 2 and in fact more desirable from the perspective of both
nodes 1 and 2 in forming a majority (51%) coalition.
Interestingly, this example also applies to PoW blockchains
that do not involve voting. The reasoning is that coalitions
between nodes with combined majority of protocol resources
can control the protocol, thus creating a threatening issue in
all permissionless blockchains, [120].
V. EFFICIENCY
After establishing that a blockchain protocol is optimal and
stable, the next concern to be addressed is whether these
goals are efficiently met or not. The main questions in this
context relate to energy waste, scalability of operations, and
comparison to centralized benchmark solutions. Formally
Q: Does the implemented protocol make efficient use of its
resources, and how does it compare to a conventional,
centralized solution?
Efficiency of computation, at least from the perspective of
time and space, has been thoroughly studied since the 1940s
by Turing and von Neumann. Algorithmic game theory and
mechanism design study questions on the intersection of
optimality, efficiency and stability [140]. While, ideally, a
protocol implements a (near) optimal equilibrium efficiently,
computational complexity theory implies that there are fun-
damental limitations of efficient computation [145]. These
limitations force us to consider trade-offs, e.g., approximate
optimality versus speed or approximation algorithms [179].
The different elements of efficiency are discussed below.
Fig. 5: Visual representation of the PREStO framework. The Blockchain consensus protocol lies in the middle of a series of concentric
circles. The inner cycle comprises the 5 major axes of PREStO and the outer cycles correspond to subcategories of increasing granularity.
Starting from this setting, the framework can be extended in a dynamic way to integrate features of future, more elaborate blockchains.
A. Energy Consumption
Efficiency exhibits a tradeoff between modest (excessive)
waste of resources and high (low) risk of security attacks.
Participating nodes in PoW protocols provide proofs of valid-
ity of the blockchain via energy-consumption which has been
shown to make them inefficient [113]. A promising alternative
is offered by the PoS or Virtual Mining protocols, in that they
spare on this huge energy waste [21], [88], [110], [115], [159].
Since PoS protocols delegate decision power via proofs of coin
(stake) ownership, their main advantage over Nakamoto’s PoW
is the environmental sustainability [21].
Energy is not the only input that can be inefficiently used by
a protocol. Data storage space, bandwidth and Random-Access
Memory are only a few [45]. Other aspects of efficiency
involve the times to process and finalize transactions and the
communication complexity that is required for the distributed
network to reach consensus [188]. Importantly, different appli-
cations introduce various degrees of uncertainty in the use
of such resources and increase the challenge of designing
efficient solutions. The hash rate for puzzle-solving and block
propagation delay also determine the outcome of the mining
competition [124]. Failing to address such issues demotivates
agents from participating and leads to centralization. In this
sense, efficiency is also related to stability [64].
Better ways to utilize the energy spent in PoW protocols
may eliminate – if successful – the advantage of PoS over
PoW protocols in terms of energy waste [15]. [181] provide
a classification of other early proposals and open questions
in this direction. Still, all these alternative proposals need to
tackle the problem of scalability, described next.
B. Scalability
Scalability refers to the property that the consensus protocol
– and hence the blockchain – benefits from the addition of
nodes or resources [194]. Generally, a blockchain is scalable if
it exhibits positive scale effects, i.e., if increased participation
leads to (i) increased throughput and (ii) improved liveness,
safety, stability and efficiency guarantees. Since these indica-
tors may respond differently to variations in the number of
nodes (or the amount of resources), it is more convenient to
understand scalability as a property of performance measures
rather than of the blockchain protocol Π as a whole. Recall
that a performance measure UΠ : X → R is called positive
(negative) if increasing values indicate better (worse) perfor-
mance, cf. Section II.
Definition 6 (Scalability). Let state X have consensus-critical
resources rn, n ∈ N, and state X ′ resources r′n such that∑
n∈N rn >
∑
n∈N r
′
n. Then Π is scalable in the positive
performance measure UΠ if UΠ (X) > UΠ (X ′) for any
X ∈ X .
Definition 6 states that a protocol Π is scalable in the
performance measure UΠ if an increase in the resources of
the current state implies an improved performance for UΠ.
The definition for negative performance measures is similar.
Example 1 (Bitcoin). To achieve its strong safety guarantees
[168], the use of computational resources by the Bitcoin
(PoW) protocol is not efficient: the maximum transaction
throughput is the same as five years ago despite a dramatic
increase in hash rate and energy consumption [143]. [24]
identify excessive spending and inefficiencies in the prevailing
equilibrium of following the Bitcoin protocol. [47] suggest
that partial or complete substitution of energy-costly mining
activities with PoS mechanisms, could benefit Bitcoin and
make it more efficient in the long-run.
Attacks on the Bitcoin can inflict significant energy waste
on miners [128]. In general, by partitioning the network or
by either censoring or delaying the propagation of blocks,
network-layer attacks can cause a significant amount of mining
power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a
wide range of attacks such as double-spending. To deal with
these threats, [130] propose a mining pool that will run as
a smart contract and show that this is a solution with good
efficiency and scaling properties.
Currently, a broadly studied solution to scalability is shard-
ing, see e.g. Elastico [127], OmniLedger [111] and Ethereum
[34], [67]. In alternative approaches, [85] model the concept of
sidechains as a means to enable scalability and interoperability
of blockchains. Their construction features merged-staking
which prevents Goldfinger attacks – attacks whose explicit
goal is to undermine and destabilize the consensus protocol
[26], [113] – and cross-chain certification based on novel
cryptographic primitives. [18] study a similar combination of
consensus protocols with PoS subchains linked to the PoW
Bitcoin blockchain.
C. Throughput
Although throughput is closely related to scalability, a
protocol can prioritize throughput even without making the
protocol fundamentally more scalable. For example, by in-
creasing the maximum number of transactions per block (e.g.,
Bitcoin Cash), throughput is increased without essentially
affecting scalability. The same is true for protocols such as
EOS and TRON, which achieve much higher throughput than,
e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum, but by curtailing the number of
potential block proposers. In fact, a BFT protocol can easily
achieve much higher throughput than a Nakamoto protocol if
the number of nodes, denoted by N , is low. However, such
protocols typically suffer from negative rather than positive
scale effects when the number of nodes increases due to the
O(N2) message complexity. So it is possible for a protocol
change to have a positive effect on throughput yet a negative
effect on scalability. This informs our definition below.
Definition 7 (Throughput). Let the performance measure
U∗Π(X) denote the long-term average transaction throughput,
starting from state X ∈ X . A blockchain protocol Π with
resources rn, n ∈ N has a higher throughput than another
protocol Π′ with the same resources if U∗Π(X) > U
∗
Π′(X).
Fundamentally, scalability concerns the effects on the out-
puts of a protocol due to a change in its resources, whereas
throughput (as a PREStO category) concerns the effects on the
outputs due to a change in protocol specifications but for the
same resource allocation.
D. Centralized Systems as Benchmarks
From a managerial perspective, the integral question in
launching a blockchain project or application is whether a
blockchain is indeed better than a centralized system for the
intended purpose [126], [185]. Since blockchains eliminate
trusted authorities to reach consensus via the coordination of
distributed and self-interested entities, several questions come
into play. How does the distributed system compare to a
benchmark solution? Does it provide improved performance
in terms of costs, efficiency and security?
Interestingly, related questions have been thoroughly re-
searched in game theory. In particular, traffic routing, queue-
ing theory and congestion networks explore precisely these
tensions between equilibration and efficiency of centrally reg-
ulated systems, [48]. The trade-offs are quantified by the Price
of Anarchy (PoA), which measures the sub-optimality caused
by self-interested behavior relative to centrally designed and
socially optimal outcomes [101], [149], [158]. PoA is defined
as the ratio between the performance of the system at the
worst-case equilibrium and that at a socially optimal state
[112].
Studying this question in the current context requires us
to quantify different aspects of blockchain performance and
compare them to either an existing or a socially optimally
(ideal) solution provided by a benevolent social planner or
authority. To measure the effects of decentralizing a system
when implementing it as a blockchain, we evaluate a derivative
notion, the Price of Decentralization (PoD), which can be
defined as
PoD (UΠ) := UΠ (D,n) /UΠ (D, 1) (2)
As above, UΠ : Π → R denotes a performance measure of
protocol Π. PoD compares the performance of the blockchain
at state Π in which the system is operated by n nodes who
all follow the protocol, strategy profile D = ×n∈Nd, to its
performance when it operates by a single node and in an
optimal way. PoD retains the flavor of PoA but isolates the
effect of decentralization. Following remarks are relevant
• Depending on the application, the denominator may refer
to an optimal solution, provided by an ideal social planner
or a centralized solution, provided by a revenue-maximizing
intermediary, or both.
• The numerator evaluates the system’s performance under
the assumption that all nodes follow the protocol. Thus, it
does not account for strategic behavior; instead it assumes a
default decentralized protocol execution and compares it to
the corresponding centralized solution. More relevant in this
direction is the approach of [135] who introduce the price
of malice, to study how a system degrades in the presence
of malicious agents.
• Unlike PoA, the range of values of PoD is not restricted by
1 and depends on (i) whether U is a positive or negative
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Partial solutions FruitChains [147], StrongChain [175] + + – +
Smart contracts Ethereum [35] + –
Checkpointing Casper FFG [36], [37] – + +
Weighted Voting [121] + + +
Zero-knowledge proofs Zcash + + –
Increased block size Bitcoin Cash – – +
Increased block frequency LiteCoin – – +
Microblocks Bitcoin-NG [69] – + –
Sharding Zilliqa [192], OmniLedger [111] + + –
TABLE IV: Overview of the impact of several illustrative protocol features on the PREStO categories.
performance measure, cf. Section II and (ii) whether the
blockchain solution improves over the performance of the
centralized solution or not.
Example 4. To illustrate the above, let UΠ : Π → N be
the number of messages that need to be exchanged between
N nodes to reach consensus according to protocol Π. In a
fully centralized execution of the system, the single entity
trivially needs to send one message to each node to inform
them of the the decision, leading to O(N) messages in total.
However, in a BFT protocol, in which every node has to send
a message to each other node, consensus takes O (N2) mes-
sages, see e.g. Solidus, Algorand or Elastico, [17]. In this case,
PoD (UΠ) = UΠ (N) /UΠ (1) = O
(
N2
)
/O (N) = O (N).
This shows that the PoD of BFT protocol Π concerning the
communication complexity UΠ is linear in the number of
nodes N and hence, is unbounded as N grows to infinity.
VI. ROBUSTNESS
Suppose that a protocol has provable performance guar-
antees within its scope (optimality) and that following the
protocol is an equilibrium (stability) at which, the protocol
resources are reasonably utilized (efficiency). The next natural
step in protocol design is to explore how smoothly and
rapidly the protocol’s properties degrade when we move away
from the vanilla setting. These concerns are expressed by the
following question:
Q: What is the resistance of the protocol to perturbations on
its underlying assumptions?
In case of a parametrizable protocol, this question may also
be phrased as the extent of parameter variation that the system
can tolerate [7]. Essentially, robustness tests the assumptions
that were used to equilibrate and stabilize the system. The
main challenge is to assess protocol performance under prac-
tical challenges that are not captured by the ideal setting of
Definition 3, such as parameter fluctuations, collusion between
nodes, and malicious or irrational behavior [99].
A. Alternative Equilibrium Concepts
The application of Nash equilibrium as a stability concept
in blockchains is not uncontroversial [11], [94]. In particular,
[94] and [56] argue that the shortcomings of Nash equilibria
in distributed computational systems involve the following
dimensions: unexpected behavior (irrational players with out-
of-system incentives), coalitional deviations, computational
limitations (resource-bounded players) and too much uncer-
tainty or a lack of information (players are unaware of all
the aspects of the game). To deal with these issues, [2], [94]
propose the notion of robust strategy profiles which consist of
two defining ingredients. On the one hand, they consider the
profit of deviating players. If k agents simultaneously deviate
from a given strategy profile but are not able to increase
their profits, then the strategy profile is said to be k-resilient.
On the other hand, they consider the harm incurred to non-
deviating players. If t agents simultaneously deviate from a
given strategy profile but are not able to decrease the profits
of non-deviating agents, then the strategy profile is said to be
t-immune. Combining these two elements yields the notion
of (k, t)-robust equilibrium as a strategy profile that is both
k-resilient and t-immune.
Despite its theoretical appeal, [94] observes that the concept
of (k, t)-robust equlibrium has its own limitations and points
to concepts of computational equilibria and particularly to the
BAR-model – model with Byzantine, Altruistic and Rational
agents – as possible alternatives [3], [11]. Nevertheless, [92]
provide strong arguments to support the use of Nash equilib-
rium by showing that large games are inately fault tolerant. In
fact, anonymous games that can be used to model blockchain
mining are shown to be resilient against irrational behaviour
(Byzantine faults), coalitions and asynchronous play.
In an approach that is particularly relevant to the blockchain
setting, [125] define robustness of an equilibrium as the
maximum proportion of malicious nodes that the desired
equilibrium strategy can tolerate, in the sense that this strategy
remains best strategy for rational players. In this definition,
robustness is understood as a local property, i.e., as a property
of a specific strategy profile and against specific adversar-
ial strategies. This definition overcomes the computational
difficulties of defining robustness on a blockchain level and
utilizes the fact, that in blockchain applications, the analysis
of robustness mainly concerns the default strategy profile.
B. Out-of-Protocol Incentives
In reality, an adversarial node may try to change the
behavior of other nodes by influencing their utility functions
through threats or rewards. One of the earliest examples of
this is feather forking [134] in Bitcoin: in this case, a miner
threatens to refuse to extend blocks if they contain a black-
listed transaction. Even if the expected impact of the threat
is small, it may be high enough compared to the small cost
of enforcing the blacklist for cooperation with the threat to be
rational. Similarly, bribery [26], [27], [131] or discouragement
[33] attacks may impact the incentives of rational nodes.
In protocols in which it is known how much consensus-
critical resources are owned by each of the nodes (i.e., semi-
permissionless or permissioned blockchains), it may be possi-
ble to predict which nodes are scheduled to propose blocks in
the near future. Accordingly, [29] identify two complementary
properties – recency and predictability – of all longest-chain
PoS protocols and devise relevant attacks to show that all
such protocols are susceptible to certain kinds of malicious
behavior. Finally, [165] explore the trade-offs between PoW
and PoS consensus and find that a combination of both
may yield robust results. In particular, for small numbers
of participants PoS exhibits better security properties against
51% attacks by mining pools but as the size of the network
increases, they recommend reverting to PoW.
C. Resistance to Malicious Behaviour
Not all nodes are solely interested in protocol rewards – for
example, they may be interested in performing a Goldfinger
attack [113], in which one cryptocurrency platform is attacked
to increase the value of others. One way of modeling this is
to give such an attacker a utility that is the inverse of the
collective utility, and calculate the total losses under the new
equilibrium. Another approach is to calculate bounds on the
losses that attackers can do relative to their own losses. In [32],
[33] this is made explicit through the griefing factor (GF). In
particular, let n,m ∈ N be nodes, x0 ∈ X be a starting state,
let D be the strategy profile where all nodes play the default
strategy, and Dn,s the profile where all nodes play d except
n who plays n. Then the griefing factor of between n and m
is defined as
GF(n,m, s) =
vm(Dn,s, x0)− vm(D,x0)
vn(Dn,s, x0)− vn(D,x0)
if the denominator is positive, and ∞ otherwise.
VII. PERSISTENCE
The four PREStO categories discussed so far consider the
protocol when it operates at or near to equilibrium conditions.
However, we have not treated blockchain performance under
destabilizing conditions, and recovery mechanisms in the event
that they occur. Hence, to establish a protocol’s persistence
property, we ask the following question
Q: How does a protocol recover if it is subjected to a severe
attack or black-swan event? How fast, and at what cost?
Whereas for robustness, we studied performance under pertur-
bations of the stability assumptions, for persistence, we take
this idea to its logical extreme. We assume that the ecosystem
is under a large-scale or protracted attack, and study whether
it is designed to recover and resume its desirable properties,
at least sufficiently often. Hence, we want to assess to what
extent a blockchain has the qualities to survive and evolve
under extreme crashes, technology shocks or other rare events.
A. Weak & Strong Persistence
To understand protocols from this perspective, we formalize
the notions of weakly and strongly persistent properties in
the blockchain context. These ideas have been introduced
within evolutionary game theory and in the study of biological
systems, i.e., recovery of an ecosystem after infection from
a virus [97], [169]. More relevant to the current context is
the combination of these ideas with tools from optimization
theory and algorithm design [20], [150]. Formally, recall that
a property or feature of a protocol Π is defined as a function
FΠ : X → {0, 1}, cf. Section II.
Definition 8 (Weakly & strongly persistent properties [148]).
Consider a protocol Π and a property FΠ : X → {0, 1}. Let
(Xt)t≥0 be a protocol execution with initial state x0 ∈ X . We
say that FΠ is
• weakly persistent for protocol Π, if for any x0, and any
T > 0, there exists t > T such that FΠ (Xt) = 1.
• strongly persistent for protocol Π, if for any x0, there exists
T > 0, such that FΠ (Xt) = 1 for all t > T .
Intuitively, a weakly persistent property will eventually be
satisfied and will become satisfied again infinitely often given
any initial system condition, whereas a strongly persistent
property will be eventually satisfied and stay satisfied given
any initial system condition, [148]. These definitions capture
the idea that a desirable property may not be satisfied by a
system in equilibrium, but in a dynamic way. This allows for
more flexibility between recovery/convergence time, “period-
icity”, and the cost of implementation.
Example 5 (The Blockchain Trilemma). The idea of support-
ing two or more incompatible properties in a weakly persistent
manner, as described above, can be exploited to deal with
the challenging “Blockchain Trilemma” [1], [51] which is
illustrated in Figure 6. The vertices of the triangle correspond
to the three seemingly incompatible but desirable properties
that blockchain consensus protocols need to satisfy: decen-
tralization, scalability and safety. Protocols can be thought of
as points inside the triangle, with coordinates indicating the
degree of satisfaction of each of these properties.
Designing an optimal protocol – i.e., a protocol which in
equilibrium satisfies simultaneously all three properties – has
been a formidable task for blockchain architects, [88]. Such a
PRESTO FRAMEWORK DESIGN OF BLOCKCHAIN CONSENSUS LAYER
Research Challenges – Opportunities
OPTIMALITY • Liveness
• Safety
• Scope
• Privacy features: public/private, permissioned/-less
• Selection of design/architecture & Sybil protection (PoW,
PoS etc.).
• Exploring the trade-off between safety and liveness.
• Secure execution of smart contracts.
STABILITY • Incentive compatibility:
Participation, Operations, Applications
• Decentralization: Entry barriers, Distribution of resources
• Fairness: reward allocation, voting-decision making
• Design of incentive compatible mechanisms.
• Protection against adversarial behavior.
• Motivate decentralization, fair distribution of resources.
EFFICIENCY • Scalability: positive scale effects
• Throughput rate
• Economy of resources/ energy consumption
• Benchmarking to centralized solutions
• Design of scalable properties.
• Reduction of energy footprint.
• Compare blockchain to conventional solutions.
ROBUSTNESS • Tolerance of perturbed assumptions/irrational behaviour
• Out-of-Protocol Incentives
• Resilience to attacks:
Incentives – Network – Cryptographic level
• Protection against collusions, Goldfinger attacks.
• Equilibration in elaborate adversarial models.
PERSISTENCE • Weak/strong persistent properties
• Large scale or majority attacks
• Recovery mechanisms: rare events
• Governance & long-term sustainability
• Defense against 51% attacks, large network partitions
• Blockchain-Trilemma
• Design of sustainable blockchains
• Decision of governance schemes
TABLE V: Challenges and current research in the design of Blockchain Protocols based on the PRESTO Framework.
protocol is indicated by the green dot in Figure 6. However,
the idea of weak persistence can be exploited for an alternative
design: a protocol could solve the trilemma by constantly
alternating between states that satisfy a non-conflicting subset
of the otherwise incompatible properties. This is captured by
the blue dot protocol and the dashed arrows in Figure 6 which
show its transition between different states.
ScalabilitySafety
Decentralization
Fig. 6: Dealing with the Blockchain Trilemma: The green dot denotes
an ideal protocol that satisfies all three properties in equilibrium.
The blue dot denotes a protocol that cycles around the ideal solution
and which satisfies the incompatible properties in a weakly persistent
(recurrent) manner.
The idea of studying distributed computation through the
lens of dynamical systems has been recently inititated by
[103]. Based on their ideas, persistence can be also used to
formulate a weaker definition of fairness, cf. Section IV-C.
Namely, a protocol can be described as fair if each node gets
to be selected in the block creation process infinitely often.
B. Recovery from Majority Attacks
One of the major challenges in blockchain consensus pro-
tocols is the recovery from attacks by malicious nodes who
control the majority of protocol resources, [26]. Existing
protocols establish their safety and liveness properties under
the assumption of either a simple – 50% – or an enhanced –
usually 67% – honest majority of nodes, [191]. Contrary to
initial beliefs, resent studies unveiled that such attacks pose
a plausible threat to existing blockchain protocols [27]. An
important insight from these studies is that it is suffices to
gain control for some short period of time, for instance by
temporarily renting protocol resources.
A suggested mechanism to recover from majority or large-
scale attacks on the Ethereum blockchain is the minority fork,
proposed by [34]. In brief, a minority fork is a mechanism
to recover the majority of the consensus-critical resources
through a fork initiated by an honest minority. Because the ma-
jority cannot create blocks on both branches of the fork, they
will be seen as offline on the minority-initiated branch, which
may cause their share to shrink on this branch. Such a scheme
is fundamentally impossible in permissionless blockchains.
C. Governance & Sustainability
Persistence is closely related to the decision processes that
determine the structure and operation of the blockchain. The
practical need for an optimal governance structure in the
Bitcoin community has already been observed by [113]. In
a different approach, [43] view the blockchain as a public
good and discuss the role of intermediaries that will provide
paid services of verification and monitoring of the blockchain
which will add value to the whole blockchain ecosystem. Ex-
cluding tentative predictions, the formal governance structure
of public, permissionless blockchains has yet to be determined,
[98]. Integral to the success of blockchains, the issues of
governance and long-term sustainability are central themes in
current blockchain evolution.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
A spatial representation of the PRESTO framework is
given in Figure 5. In Table V, we summarize its categories
and subcategories and use it to identify research challenges
and perspectives. Owning to its modular structure, PRESTO
can be expanded or modified to accommodate advances or
additional research opportunities in the future of blockchain
protocols. Accordingly, it can be used to track the evolution
of the blockchain ecosystem and structure the communication
between its diverse participants who range from protocol
designers, technology experts and end users to academics,
corporate managers and strategic investors.
Summing up, the PRESTO framework sees protocols as
multi-dimensional objects with the following cascade of goals.
First, optimality requires that the protocol solves the problem
that it is defined to address, otherwise there is no good reason
to deploy it and the designer should go back to the drawing
board. Second, stability aims to ensure that self-interested
agents have an incentive to follow and implement the protocol,
i.e., that the protocol itself is an equilibrium. If not, the agents
will deviate from it and the deployed protocol will behave un-
predictably in practice. Next, efficiency requires that resources
are used as efficiently as possible (e.g. time, space, network
bandwidth, energy, randomness, etc.). Given an optimal, stable
and efficient protocol, the next steps are to consider more
elaborate behavioral models from the perspective of the agents.
These entail robustness and persistence which measure the
resilience of the established equilibria in less idealized settings
and the performance of the blockchain in highly perturbed,
non-equilibrium conditions, respectively.
The exploration of these trade-offs is an area for multidisci-
plinary research that relies on the synthesis of ideas from game
theory, cryptography and theoretical computer science. In this
direction, PREStO can be used as a dynamic framework to
structure the communication between researchers with diverse
backgrounds and to accommodate increasingly more elaborate
features of future blockchain protocols.
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